by MANOËL JOHR
On 1 September the German foreign minister announced its intention of “terminating the lease for the Russian House in Berlin”, a cultural institution operated by the Russian Federation, in reaction to drone incidents of 4 August on German territory attributed to Russia. Other blogposts have analysed the problems of terminating the underlying treaties under a law of treaty perspective (see here, here and here). I shall briefly recapitulate those findings before proposing possible alternative routes to actually close the House.
Law of Treaty-Based Solutions and Beyond
The regime of the Russian House in Berlin is governed by two bilateral treaties. One (2960 UNTS I-51454), hereinafter called the “Lease Agreement” concerns the actual ownership and property regimes. The second treaty (2875 UNTS I-50173), hereinafter called the “Cultural Centres Agreement” concerns the right of Russia to conduct cultural diplomacy from the premises of the Russian House. Under their respective terms, the Cultural Centres Agreement might be terminated by 6 June 2027 (see Article 12), the Lease Agreement may only be terminated after 99 years, making termination possible only in 2112 (see Article 5(1)). Both treaties, therefore, do not allow a swift termination as announced (see for more details here, here and here).
This has led authors to look at articles 60(1) and 62 VCLT. These articles allow a termination due to violation of reciprocal obligations Russia owes to Germany, and due to a fundamental change of circumstances respectively. The violations invoked by Germany do not concern reciprocal obligations and even if breaches of reciprocal obligations where found, Germany would probably have acquiesced their invocation under article 45(b) VCLT. As to fundamental change of circumstances, it is doubtful even for Russia’s war of aggression to reach the high threshold required under international law (see Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, para. 104). Thus, it seems, the law of treaties does not allow termination.
So, let us look at the actual steps Germany might take and see how to justify those from both a domestic and an international perspective.
Domestic Law Avenues for Germany
As to the consequences of the announced “termination”, authors (here and especially here) have considered the question of civil law enforcement immunity, which I will not dive into further, and the question if the use of the House by Russia could simply be stopped.
It has been suggested that Germany act under its domestic public law. Besides the implementation of asset freezes required by EU law preventing acquisition of basic supply, such as electricity, for more than bare minimum use of the House (see here, esp. paras. 91–2), there is the somewhat parallel case of the “Berlin City Hotel”, rented out by North Corea from its embassy. Following that example, Germany could, under its domestic law, enact a similar prohibition for Russia to use the House under the general clause of Berlin’s police law.
In difference to the City Hostel case, this could not be based on a violation by a renting third-party of the EU sanctions regulation (see here, para. 19 et seq.). No-one is making available funds to Russia contrary to article 2(2) of Regulation (EU) 269/2014 but Russia itself is using the House. But any espionage activities from the House, which have been reported, would satisfy the requirements of the general clause. Additionally, there is the (theoretical) possibility of simply enacting a law prohibiting Russia’s use of the House. An order prohibiting the use of the House could then be enforced, if need be, under Berlin’s domestic administrative law.
International Justification Under the Law of Countermeasures
On the international plane this action would constitute a wrongful act since the treaties explicitly allowing Russia the use of the House have not, and probably cannot, be terminated. To avoid incurring international responsibility, Germany would have to seek ways of justifying its conduct—which has not yet been examined elsewhere. The law of countermeasures could be a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of such an act (article 22 ARSIWA).
Countermeasures may be taken by a state in response to another state’s unlawful conduct to induce the latter’s compliance with the breached obligation (article 49(1) ARSIWA). Germany is expressly acting in response to the drone incidents of 4 August 2026 which it attributes to Russia. Those actions, while not amounting to an armed attack, certainly violate Germany’s territorial integrity and may even be considered a “simple” use of force (cf. Nicaragua judgment, paras. 191, 195).
Thus, Germany may react via lawful countermeasures, meaning the modalities of articles 49–53 ARSIWA must be respected. Beside the formal requirement of a sommation (article 52(1)(a) ARSIWA), which seems not yet to have been issued, there are no real problems there. The measures are surely proportional (article 51 ARSIWA) given the gravity of Russia’s violation in relation to the reaction. They are reversible (articles 49(3), 53 ARSIWA) since a prohibition of use of the House could, at any time, be revoked and the use resumed. And finally, the measure would not touch upon diplomatic immunities (article 50(2)(b) ARSIWA) because the Russian House does not form diplomatic premises but constitutes a separate entity.
Discrepancy Between Domestic and International Measure
We see, now, that domestic and international justification are based on quite different legal grounds and thus follow different logics and purposes.
There is, however, no reason, I think, why this would render either measure illicit. On the contrary, domestic and international sphere can diverge as to the legality of a measure – domestic illegality is irrelevant to international law (cf. article 27 VCLT), international illegality only influences the domestic sphere insofar as is provided for by the latter (see here, esp. paras 61–2). This possible discrepancy between the international and the domestic spheres makes it, in my opinion, necessary to also separate legal justifications between both levels and consider them independently, albeit that, due to article 25 of the German basic law, such a conflict should be avoided.
Conclusion
Hence, while Germany may not be in a position to formally terminate the treaties relating to the Russian House in Berlin, it can take measures effecting the closure of the House based on domestic law provisions. Internationally, the very same measures can be justified as lawful countermeasures.
Suggested citation: Johr, Manoël, Closing the Russian House: Domestic and International Legal Bases, JuWissBlog No. 81/2026, 30.09.2026, https://www.juwiss.de/81-2026/
This work is licenced as CC BY-SA 4.0.
