On 19 February 2025, the Supreme Court of India, in an extraordinary move, took suo moto cognizance of an order passed by the Lokpal (India’s anti-corruption ombudsman), which asserted jurisdiction over a sitting High Court judge. The order was stayed almost immediately, with the Court expressing strong reservations about the Lokpal’s reach into the domain of constitutionally appointed judges. At a follow-up hearing, in a bid to stay impartial, the Court brought in an amicus curiae, signalling its awareness of the broader implications of this jurisdictional contestation. While the Court’s caution is understandable, the fundamental question remains: should sitting High Court judges be beyond the investigative reach of a statutory body like the Lokpal?
Though specific allegations remain redacted in public orders, the principles at stake, at any rate, transcend the particulars of this case. The debate turns on two interrelated but distinct issues that shape the larger conversation: (1) whether the constitutional status of judges, by virtue of their appointment under Articles 124 and 217, exempts them from scrutiny by a statutory body like the Lokpal, and (2) whether judicial independence is necessarily compromised by external accountability. This article argues that neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the constitutional text explicitly precludes investigatory oversight – a gap that Section 14 of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, fills by subjecting all public servants to scrutiny unless expressly exempted. Furthermore, judicial independence must not be confused with institutional untouchability. Accountability mechanisms can, and must, coexist with necessary safeguards to preserve both judicial integrity and autonomy.
The Lokpal’s Reach and the Functional Necessity of Judicial Accountability
While judicial functions must remain independent, there is a difference between administrative and ethical oversight that we must understand. The idea that oversight disrupts judicial independence disregards the fact that judges, as constitutional functionaries, are still part of the broader public administration. Judicial independence is not an absolute shield against accountability. Instead, it protects adjudicatory functions from external influence while still leaving room for legitimate oversight. The Lokpal’s jurisdiction, properly understood, would operate as a functional check ensuring ethical and administrative integrity without encroaching upon the judiciary’s ability to decide cases independently.
Even the Constitution itself does not expressly insulate judges from external oversight. It prescribes removal mechanisms – impeachment under Articles 124(4) and 218 – but remains silent on investigatory processes. Meanwhile, Section 14 of the Lokpal Act explicitly brings all public servants under scrutiny, unless expressly exempted. To this end, I submit that the absence of an exemption for sitting judges is instructive. Had the Parliament intended to exclude them, it would have done so explicitly, just as it exempted the Prime Minister’s decision-making on matters of national security under Section 14(1)(a).
The case for judicial oversight is further reinforced by the Veeraswamy verdict, which confirmed that judges qualify as „public servants“ under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. But the argument does not end there. Judges also act as trustees of public power. For (1) their salaries are drawn from the Consolidated Fund of States, (2) their appointments require a Presidential warrant, and (3) their conduct is subject to parliamentary scrutiny through impeachment proceedings. These indicia only reinforce their public function, aligning them with other functionaries explicitly named in Section 14 of the Lokpal Act (readers are encouraged to undertake a closer textual reading of Section 14).
Finally, it is important to note that the Lokpal’s reading of its jurisdiction is premised on a key distinction: the Supreme Court is established directly by the Constitution, whereas High Courts, though provided for in the Constitution, derive their specific existence from Acts of Parliament (the Delhi High Court, for example, was created by the Delhi High Court Act, 1966). While this differentiation may appear overly technical, it reflects a substantive distinction in how these institutions are grounded in law. For the High Courts, unlike the Supreme Court, do not trace their existence solely to the Constitution but also to the specific legislative enactments that shape them. And so, given that the Lokpal Act applies to statutory bodies and their functionaries under Section 14(1)(f), there is a rather compelling argument to be made that judges of such courts fall within its purview. The Supreme Court judges, in contrast, remain outside its reach, as their authority stems solely from the Constitution. To claim immunity for High Court judges despite this classification would require an explicit constitutional or statutory exclusion. As things stand, it does not exist..
Judicial Accountability as a Constitutional Imperative
To argue that judicial independence is irreconcilable with external accountability is to conflate autonomy with absolute immunity. Independence ensures adjudicatory impartiality, but can not justify institutional opacity. Unchecked independence breeds moral hazard. No constitutional democracy should ever assume that accountability mechanisms (by their mere existence) erode judicial integrity. Instead, the only challenge is to design oversight that preserves autonomy while preventing institutional decay. Judges, like all wielders of public power, derive a part of their legitimacy from public confidence. But that confidence is not self-sustaining. It must be continuously reaffirmed through mechanisms that ensure transparency and ethical scrutiny.
The absence of investigatory oversight allows ethical lapses to go unexamined, which only ends up corroding public trust. True judicial independence is not about eliminating scrutiny but about structuring it in ways that reinforce both integrity and impartiality by shielding the institution from political interference and pressure tactics. Hence, the Lokpal’s jurisdiction in no way threatens judicial functions but merely ensures ethical oversight. It neither adjudicates cases nor interferes with the judicial exercise of reasoning. If impeachment under Article 218 is the ultimate remedy for judicial misconduct of a sitting High Court judge, an investigatory process must logically precede it. To insist that impeachment alone suffices assumes that misconduct is always severe enough to warrant removal. But accountability is not a binary construct—ethical violations exist on a spectrum, and not all warrant impeachment. A system that lacks investigatory mechanisms risks enabling misconduct while maintaining the illusion of judicial infallibility.
To conclude, the Supreme Court’s intervention in this matter, while unsurprising given the judiciary’s natural resistance to external oversight, misses one crucial point. The real question, then, is not whether judges should be subject to investigation, but rather how such investigations should be conducted and by whom. The Lokpal Act, conceived as an independent ombudsman, was specifically designed to address corruption at all levels of governance. If, as in the present case (despite the redaction of specific details in the order), a High Court judge can influence cases for a private company, the absence of an independent investigatory mechanism creates a dangerous accountability void. Independence without accountability is aristocracy, independence with accountability is democracy. The choice, though often framed as contentious, should be obvious.
Zitiervorschlag: Singh, Rajyavardhan, Ombudsman’s Mandate, Judicial Integrity, and the Limits of Constitutional Privilege, JuWissBlog Nr. 37/2025 v. 17.04.2025, https://www.juwiss.de/37-2025/
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