von SRISHTI GAUR
On 20th May 2025, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India in All India Judges Association (“AIJA”) and Ors. v Union of India mandated the requirement of three years of legal practice for those willing to appear for entry-level judicial service examinations. While framed as a measure to enhance judicial competence, the ruling begs a deeper question: does this decision truly serve the judiciary’s goals, or does it end up narrowing access to one of the most crucial public institutions?
Building on this development, the blog post critiques the ruling on two grounds: first, the judgment fails to establish a causal relation between litigation practice of three years and judicial proficiency; second, the ruling has a disproportionate and exclusionary impact on women, persons with disabilities (PwD) and individuals from economically disadvantaged backgrounds.
Judgment without a Justification
The requirement of three years of legal practice before appearing for entry-level judicial examination has haunted the Indian judiciary for long. In the Second AIJA case, the court decided that experience as a lawyer is essential to the post of a judge to discharge their duties efficiently. However, the instatement was short-lived since the Supreme Court in the Third AIJA case dispensed with the rule following the Shetty Commission recommendations. The present ruling brings the debate to a full circle by restoring the requirement.
In arriving at its conclusion, the apex court merely called upon the responses of High Courts and state governments (para 54). The responses of the court were taken into consideration to form the basis for reinstating the three years of practice rule (paras 62-80), however, no empirical evidence was looked into before reaching the decision.
The judgment time and again emphasized the lack of uniformity in eligibility criteria for judicial service examinations across states to demonstrate the need for a uniform rule (para 57), however, it failed to answer definitively as to why three years are needed – why not less or more?
For this arbitrary endorsement of a fixed threshold, the court relied on the 14th Law Commission of India Report (1958) that recommended that three years of practice at the bar is essential. However, the court failed to note that the Report was formulated at the time when the law degree course was for two years – which is not the current structure, where a law course of 3 or 5 years exists in the country. Moreover, as of today, the Bar Council of India mandates that students complete 12 or 20 weeks of internship, depending on their course, as a requirement to expose students to courtroom procedures and legal practice. By ignoring these developments, the court relied on a 1958 report which does not reflect the current rigour of legal education. The judgment failed to critically evaluate the necessity or proportionality of the three-year requirement considering the evolved standard and did not even attempt to explore alternatives that could have ensured competence.
Exclusion by Eligibility
The rule is without any exception and is bound to have a disproportionate effect on judicial aspirants, specifically women, PwD and individuals from financially weak backgrounds. The principle of substantive equality requires that reasonable accommodation should be made to accommodate people of varying backgrounds – the same has been emphasized by the Indian courts repeatedly. Decisions as this one, which affect people at large, cannot be divorced from the socio-economic realities and ignoring such dimensions undermines inclusivity.
A closer examination of the representation of women paints a concerning picture. To put it into perspective – in a report by Sumathi Chandrashekharan et el., it was reported for the period from 2007-17, the number of women entering the lower judiciary (civil judge) has steadily increased i.e. 36.45%. However, this was in stark contrast with the district judge cadre (higher level position) wherein only 11.75% of women joined the district judgeship. The major reason for this disparity was the eligibility rules that required seven years of continuous practice as a lawyer to qualify for being a district judge. As per the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the requirement in Sushma Suri v Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, the practice has to be continuous and cannot be disjunctive. This eligibility criteria disqualifies many women who primarily due to societal pressures of marriage, motherhood and household duties have to leave their practice, thereby becoming ineligible under this criterion.
Adding to this picture, a requirement of three years of practice for an entry-level judgeship is bound to tilt the numbers further. As per the data gathered by the Bar Council, as of 2023, women accounted for only 15% of the total number of advocates in India. In a country where the median age of first marriage of women is 19.2 years, and about 1 in 3 working women leave employment after marriage – considering such a state of affairs, expecting fresh women law graduates to meet the three-year experience requirement further shrinks the narrow pipeline.
Moving to candidates with disabilities, situations get worse due to infrastructural and societal insensitivity. The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (“RPwD”) mandates that all government buildings, including courts, must be accessible to persons with disabilities, however, it is not followed in practice. A 2024 report by the Centre for Research and Planning of the Supreme Court reported that half of the District Court complexes in India do not have ramps, only 25.2% have wheelchairs available and merely 5.1% have tactile pavement.
The social model of disability was recognized through RPwD which shifts the focus from an individual’s impairments to the barriers that the society creates whether physical, structural or attitudinal. In Vikas Kumar v Union of India, the apex court recognized the right to reasonable accommodation and explained that the denial of it amounts to discrimination within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the RPwD (para 33). The rigid criterion that demands continuous practice at a place where accessibility and sensitivity does not exist, the judicial system risks excluding those it is meant to represent.
Last, focussing on members from economically disadvantaged groups, the picture is equally troubling. Legal education in India, especially at prestigious institutions, involves substantial costs. After graduating, the candidates seek judicial exams a route to upward mobility. On the contrary, litigation, at the entry-level, offers meagre compensation.
The Bar Council of India, acknowledging this, issued a notification laying down directory guidelines for payment of a minimum monthly stipend to junior advocates of a nominal amount of Rs. 20,000 (206.12 Euro) in urban areas and Rs. 15,00 (154.59 Euro) in rural areas. These guidelines are merely recommendatory and these amounts are far from sufficient to sustain individuals without other financial support. The mandate, thus, imposes a disproportionate opportunity cost on those who can least afford it.
Importantly, the policy structure evokes the principle of indirect discrimination which the court recognized in Nitisha Colonel. The principle refers to a seemingly neutral requirement that disproportionately effects members of certain communities, despite having no intention to do so. The reinstatement of the three-year practice rule exemplifies this very phenomenon.
Though presented under the façade of being a neutral quality-control measure, it disproportionately excludes women, persons with disabilities, and economically disadvantaged individuals from entering the judiciary due to its clear disregard for the structural and socio-economic barriers and failure to uphold the constitutional promise of substantive equality.
Conclusion
The reinstatement of the three-year litigation practice appears to be less of a calibrated reform and more of a nostalgic return to an idea of training that is not grounded in present realities. The court failed to understand that judicial reforms require a forward-looking (re)imagination and not rigidity, the path of which must be inclusive and evidence-led. One hopes that future deliberation will balance the hurdles that the judgment created.
Zitiervorschlag: Gaur, Srishti, Three Years To The Bench But At What Cost – A Critique Of Indian Supreme Courts Eligibility Mandate, JuWissBlog Nr. 51/2025 v. 05.06.2025, https://www.juwiss.de/51-2025/
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