von TJORBEN STUDT
The “Memorandum of Understanding” between the US and Iran, meant to guide the peace negotiations over the war on Iran, secures almost none of the US-aims it was fought for. It is not without irony that Trump proudly signed this Memorandum at Versailles. It may yet become his own “Treaty of Versailles”.
The “Memorandum of Understanding” as evidence of a war the US could not win
The case for this war was built on necessity and humanitarian purposes. The US claimed in its Art. 51 Letter to the UN Security Council that it had acted on 28 February 2026 “to address the continuing threat posed by the Iranian regime” arguing that all diplomatic negotiations have failed because “the regime refused to negotiate in good faith” on a diplomatic resolution that “would bring peace, prosperity and security for all States in the region, prevent the regime’s development of ballistic missile capabilities directly threatening United States Armed Forces in the region, protect Iran’s citizens and eliminate the threat from the regime’s nuclear program.”
Furthermore, the military operation was specifically undertaken “to protect United States Armed Forces in the region, to ensure the free flow of maritime commerce through the Strait of Hormuz and to protect our regional allies and partners from Iran and its proxies.”
These are words that ring hollow in light of how the war against Iran actually unfolded and what it has produced under the “Memorandum of Understanding”. If anything, the result is worse than the situation it replaced, leaving Iran probably financially better equipped and more powerful in the region. The free flow of commerce through the Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to return as it was because the war has taught Iran that it can hold the world hostage through the control over the Strait, and it has little reason to withdraw from this practice. The “Memorandum of Understanding” seems to acknowledge this, as a charge-free flow is agreed only for 60 days while the future administration and maritime services should be discussed by Iran and Oman.
Iran’s potential nuclear weapons capability, the very thing the war was allegedly fought for, is only vaguely addressed in the “Memorandum of Understanding”. While the concessions to Iran, which are to be included in the final peace agreement or implemented in the meantime, are clear and specific (USD 300 billion for Iran’s reconstruction and development; termination of all sanctions against Iran; immediate waiver of sanctions on specific Iranian exports; release of frozen Iranian funds and assets), Iran’s concessions relate only to the opening of the Strait of Hormuz for 60 days without charge, the reaffirmation “that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons”, and a statement that the resolution mechanism for the disposal of enriched material “will be mutually agreed upon”. Even if it remains unclear whether the parties will agree on a final deal to end the conflict or whether the circle of violence will continue, the end of this war seems to be outlined.
The legal justifications were flawed from the outset to the conflict’s potential end
The legal justifications fared no better. They rested above all on anticipatory self-defence against the acquisition of a threatening capability by Iran, in particular a nuclear striking capability. On the premise that Iran was allegedly close to obtaining a nuclear weapon, the US engaged in an aggressive war against Iran. This argument had already and rightly been considered flawed by the majority of scholars, because the immediacy requirement for anticipatory self-defence is not met where a state is only in the process of acquiring such threatening capability and pre-emptive strikes, even in the face of possible nuclear striking capability, is not recognised as lawful either. The foregoing course of the war, together with the “Memorandum of Understanding”, contradicts this justification even more clearly in retrospect.
The standard for anticipatory self-defence requires a danger so immediate that it leaves no moment for deliberation. If there is time now for diplomatic consultations over enrichment, accompanied by the granting of additional resources to Iran, then there seems to have been time before the first US strikes took place, when corresponding consultations were still ongoing. The same holds true for the argument from the logic of survival, advanced by a few scholars, that no state can be made to wait for a nuclear first strike. The ballistic missile program was apparently tolerable enough to be left out of the “Memorandum of Understanding”. The humanitarian purpose put forward does not survive in retrospect either, as the “Memorandum of Understanding” addresses no changes for the Iranian population at all or makes them a condition for certain concessions. It therefore cannot be said that this war was fought to free the Iranian people from their oppressive regime. Rather, humanitarian intervention, among other justifications advanced for the use of force, unfortunately served here as no more than a guise for an unlawful war.
Outlook
The threats said to be grave enough to override the UN Charter and the collective security system, leaving aside humanitarian concerns and the consequences for the civilian population, turned out to be negotiable the moment the price tag became too high. It remains to be seen whether there is a realistic possibility of a stable peace between the parties to the conflict, or whether, as is already the case during the peace negotiations, there is an ongoing threat of force (or of kidnapping the Iranian negotiating team).
Accordingly, until such a stable peace is reached, it might be more accurate to speak of a ceasefire where there is fire or, looking at the other side of the coin, of a bellum interruptum: a state of war as the normal relationship between the US and Iran, interrupted by phases in which there is no fire, in accordance with a ceasefire agreement that exists only on paper.
For allies of the US, it becomes clear that a state that engages in an unnecessary and unlawful war is no pillar of peace or reliable security. Instead, such a state creates chaos and risks to make things worse, not better. Deterrence and security rests on the belief that a reliable ally will act with judgement and this war so far supplied the opposite example showing western Middle Powers once again the urgency to become more independent of the US.
Lastly, ironic as it might be, Trump, who routinely disregards international law, must resort to the instruments of international law to end a war he started and could not win.
Zitiervorschlag: Tjorben Studt, Trump’s “Treaty of Versailles” – the possible, deserved end to an unnecessary and unlawful war, JuWissBlog Nr. 60/2026 v. 07.07.2026, https://www.juwiss.de/60-2026/
Dieses Werk ist unter der Lizenz CC BY-SA 4.0 lizenziert.
