von Tanmay Durani
The Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Bill, 2024, recently tabled in the Lok-Sabha [LS], lower-house of the Parliament, proposes an overhaul of the Indian electoral system through introduction of simultaneous elections for the LS and State/Union-Territory Legislative Assemblies, encapsulated in the proposed insertion of Article 82(A). This reform aims to synchronize election cycles, establish fixed tenures for the LS, and align them with State Assembly elections. According to this amendment, if the LS or any State Assembly is dissolved prematurely, any ensuing mid-term elections would only be for the remainder of the original five-year term.
This initiative has sparked debates about its constitutionality, raising questions about Parliament’s authority to enact such changes and whether they align with or undermine the Constitution’s foundational principles, especially regarding Federalism and Parliamentary Democracy.
Scholars have argued that implementing One Nation One Election (ONOE) would reduce the financial burden of conducting frequent elections and enhance administrative efficiency, a position that is tenable under law. My response to such ideas, which I aim to articulate in this article, is twofold: 1) The introduction of ONOE could perpetuate problems through what Scholar Khaitan refers to as ‚constitutional-cuts‘ embedded in the Indian Constitution; 2) ONOE is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution.
Risk of Centralized control through Constitutional-Cuts
As a matter of fact, while the Bill proposes to synchronize the state-legislative elections and the LS elections throughout the country to cut on costs – the bill still assumes a situation where an election to an assembly cannot be conducted at the time of general-elections. Here, a power under proposed Article 82A (5) is given to the Election Commission of India [ECI], that if it is of the opinion that elections to any Assembly cannot be conducted at the time of General-Elections, it may make a recommendation to the President, who may then declare by an Order that election to that Assembly may be conducted at a later date.
Here, the fundamental problem is that the proposed Article currently lacks specificity regarding the basis of the ECI’s opinions and under what circumstances it can advise the president to postpone elections. This ambiguity opens the door to subjective interpretations and potential bias and abuse. Given that the ECI’s composition is determined by an executive-dominated committee—(what is referred to as One of thousand constitutional-cuts constitutional-cut by Khaitan) including the Prime Minister, a Cabinet Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition—there is a heightened risk of partisan influence. This is particularly concerning in situations where the Union government may not feel confident about electoral outcomes in state assemblies controlled by opposition parties, potentially leading to unfair treatment or decisions to delay elections without clear, objective criteria.
There must be conditions specified – such as natural disasters, security concerns, or other exceptional circumstances that justify a delay. Additionally, to enhance transparency and accountability, the ECI’s recommendations to the President should be required to be made public, along with detailed justifications for any decision to postpone elections.
Violative of the basic structure of the constitution
The Supreme Court of India [Apex Court] in Kesavananda Bharati case (para 482) firmly established that free and fair elections are a fundamental component of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution. This doctrine of the basic structure is pivotal as it stipulates that certain core principles are so fundamental to the constitution that they cannot be altered or destroyed through amendments by the Parliament. For a German audience: India’s basic structure doctrine is similar to Article 79(3) of the German Constitution, which safeguards key principles like federalism, state participation in legislation, and fundamental human rights against amendments.
In this context, I submit that the proposed constitutional amendment enabling ONOE undermines the basic structure by potentially compromising the fairness of the electoral process. Although Senior Advocate Salve, a member of the panel led by Mr. Ram Nath Kovind which advocated for ONOE, expressed confidence in electorate’s wisdom and maturity, research suggests a contrary scenario. This amendment risks influencing voter behavior in ways that could degrade the integrity of elections, highlighting a significant misalignment with the foundational tenets of our democracy.
A study on holding national and state elections at the same time indicates that it can make voting more complicated for people. This complexity leads voters to rely more on basic indicators like party affiliation rather than considering diverse local issues.
India’s constitution creates a federal system where power is shared between the national government and state governments. This division is meant to protect both national unity and regional independence. However, when elections for both levels of government are synchronized, the focus often shifts to national issues, overshadowing local concerns. This can make all regions seem politically similar and might benefit the main national party, weakening the variety and relevance of local political choices. By elevating national issues, this practice can dilute the importance of regional matters in elections, leading to less political diversity and a stronger central government. This might not only favor the current ruling party at the national level but also diminish the influence of smaller regional parties and issues, which is contrary to the federal principle of giving importance to local governance and interests.
This type of voter reaction should be taken note of—especially since the Model Code of Conduct, which is released by the ECI, contains various provisions that prohibit political parties from influencing the decisions of voters to the disadvantage of another political party—specifically by providing an uneven playing field. For instance, ECI prohibits financing Elections through government funds. Allowing the use of government funds for election campaigns would provide an unfair advantage to Union government and the party members – since they have a larger size funds.
The reason behind this is self-explanatory – allowing the use of government resources for campaigning could unfairly benefit some candidates over others. Given the need for a level playing field in elections and evidence that ONOE could skew voter behavior to favor national parties at the expense of regional ones, this idea appears fundamentally flawed.
Conclusion
Simultaneous Elections may appear to promote administrative efficiency, it poses significant risks by potentially centralizing political power and diminishing the influence of regional issues, which are essential in a culturally and politically diverse country like India.
To the German readers, imagine the potential implications of bundling Bundestag and Landtag elections: it could shift focus from local to national issues, weakening the representation of regional interests. In India, where federalism allows states significant autonomy, such a change could undermine this balance, promoting a homogenized political narrative that may not reflect the diverse priorities of its various states. This approach risks not just the oversimplification of voter choices but also the erosion of the federal structure that supports India’s democratic fabric. It could transform the complex mosaic of Indian politics into a monolithic structure, overly influenced by the central government, thereby diluting the rich diversity that characterizes regional political dynamics.
Zitiervorschlag: Durani, Tanmay, One Nation, One Election: Electoral Synchronicity, Federal Autonomy, and the Basic Structure, JuWissBlog Nr. 6/2025 v. 23.01.2025, https://www.juwiss.de/6-2025/
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