Ditching the Crown, Keeping the Chains? Jamaica’s 2024 Constitutional Amendment Bills and the “Westmonster” Legacy

von AADITI SINHA 

Jamaica’s 2024 bills promise a republic, but with the Privy Council and Westminster power intact, is this true decolonisation or just a new face on the same old system? The Governor‑General would be replaced by an elected President, yet real authority remains concentrated in the Prime Minister’s hands. Without replacing the Privy Council or reforming executive powers, the island may be trading symbols, not sovereignty.

From Crown to Republic?

In the era of decolonial constitutionalism, Jamaica’s recently tabled Constitutional Amendment Bill, seeking to transition the nation from a constitutional monarchy to a sovereign parliamentary republic, has been widely celebrated in constitutional law circles. Through this amendment, Jamaica aims to replace the office of Governor-General, who locally represents the British monarch, with an elected President as Head of State. Long anticipated and while the path to full implementation remains lengthy, the bill marks a significant symbolic and political milestone.

However, echoing critiques of other Caribbean constitutions, I believe these reforms risk amounting to ‘false decolonisation’: a symbolic rupture that leaves intact deeper colonial-era power structures, such as the continued retention of the Privy Council and a transplanted Westminster model that borders on elective dictatorship. 

What the Bills Say (and Don’t)

Jamaica is a parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy, with the British Monarch serving as Head of State, represented locally by the Governor-General (formally appointed by the Monarch, but actually chosen by the Prime Minister (“PM”)). The Executive is led by the PM and Cabinet, who are drawn from the elected legislature and hold primary political authority. The Legislature is a bicameral Parliament comprising the appointed Senate and the elected House of Representatives, responsible for making laws.

Moving to the constitutional amendments, two bills are central to this discussion. The first (“CAB I”), intended to give effect to “a Constitution enacted by the Parliament of Jamaica and approved by the people of Jamaica,” involves a modification to Section 61 of the Jamaican Constitution, which, in essence, replaces references to the Governor-General and the Queen, with the Parliament of Jamaica.

The second set of amendments (“CAB II”) introduces broader changes to the Constitution, forming the legal foundation for Jamaica’s transition from a constitutional monarchy to a sovereign republic. These include, inter alia, provisions for the establishment of the Office of the President, detailing the procedure for her appointment, powers, and functions.

A Republic in Name, a “Westmonster” State in Practice

The system of governance envisioned in the proposed amendments clearly reflects the Westminster model of parliamentary government – one that was transplanted into Jamaica, as in much of the Caribbean, as a legacy of colonial imposition. This model is marked by a concentration of executive power in single-party, bare-majority cabinets; a predominantly two-party system; a unitary and centralized government; and a tendency toward unicameralism, with the lower house exercising dominance. At its core, the Westminster system features a ceremonial head of state, while real executive authority rests with a PM who leads a Cabinet drawn from the legislature, controls ministerial appointments, and is both individually and collectively accountable to the elected legislative body.

However, the proposed amendments eliminate colonial vestiges only at a symbolic level and fall short of substantive decolonization for two key reasons. First, while the proposed amendments remove the British Monarch from Jamaica’s Executive and Legislature, they notably retain the United Kingdom (“UK”)-based Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as the country’s final appellate court, despite its limited jurisdiction to only few cases of monetary or public relevance and colonial legacy. Senator Scott-Motley remarks that the amendment essentially “cannot leave the king but still have to petition him when you want justice to be delivered to your people.”

A regional alternative, the Caribbean Court of Justice (“CCJ”), has existed for nearly two decades. Headquartered in Trinidad and partially funded by Jamaica, the CCJ is designed to serve as the region’s apex court. Yet, the bills remain silent on transitioning to it. Scholars argue that the shift to the CCJ is not a matter of if, but when, citing its alignment with Caribbean legal traditions, its independent and apolitical judicial appointments, and its progressive jurisprudence in advancing human rights and constitutional protections.

 Second, the Westminster system, which also carries with it the dangers inherent in the system (as discussed further), is not only being retained, despite the claims to decolonise the nation, but actively reinforced through the proposed bills. This is further because of three reasons. Firstly, the PM continues to wield considerable influence over both the Legislature and the Executive. This concentration of power is reflected in the proposed appointment process for the President, which requires assent from both the PM and the Leader of the Opposition, but ultimately allows the PM to unilaterally nominate a candidate if no agreement is reached within three months. While, in all cases, the nominee must be approved by a majority vote by both Houses of Parliament in a joint sitting by secret ballot, it does not remove the jarring control of PM over selection of the nominee in the first place.

Closer to home, Barbados adopted a similar consensus-based model for electing its President, requiring agreement between the PM and the Leader of the Opposition. However the difference is here: if no consensus nominee is put forward by the 60th day before the end of the incumbent’s term, the election opens to other candidates. To qualify for the ballot in this scenario, a candidate must be nominated either by the PM, the Leader of the Opposition, or by at least ten members of the House of Assembly. This framework avoids conferring residual powers of nomination in the hands of the PM, allowing for a democratic election of the President.

Secondly, and more troubling is that the bill retains unchecked powers for the PM, including the ability to dissolve Parliament at will – a provision described as giving the PM “dictatorial” control for five years; allowing her to ‘bully’ the Cabinet, Parliament, and the Government. Scholars have noted that in Jamaica, it is difficult for MPs to remove a sitting PM without risking a general election, which discourages internal party challenges. A no-confidence vote leads to automatic dissolution of Parliament under §64(5) of the Constitution, and even a vote to revoke the PM’s appointment allows the PM the choice to dissolve Parliament instead of stepping down under §71(2)-(3).

Thirdly, the proposed amendment gives the PM’s party a guaranteed majority in the Senate, leaving little room for opposition bills be passed by the Lower House. As per §17 of the CAB II, the 27-member Senate would include fifteen appointed on the PM’s advice, nine on the Leader of the Opposition’s, and three at the President’s discretion. While it requires a stronger 2/3^rd majority vote for significant amendments to the Constitution, for ordinary bills and minor changes to the Constitution, it ensures that opposition and independent senators cannot jointly block a Bill, since only a simple majority is required. Overall, the Senate’s authority to delay ordinary legislation is restricted, and it has virtually no power over money bills, especially given the government’s built-in majority, which makes such delays unlikely.

Combined with two-party dominance, a Cabinet led by the PM from the House of Representatives, and a constitution which does not seem to incorporate the principle of separation of power at all, this risks, or rather promotes, creation of what Hailsham calls “elective dictatorship” where, in a Westminster setup, power is concentrated in the hands of the executive (the PM and a small cabinet) dominating the Parliament and Judiciary with little checks on its powers.

Although the risk of elective dictatorship exists in all Westminster-style governments, Jamaica’s uncritical transplantation of the model and the critical juncture it now faces in seeking to move beyond its colonial past make the need to reform these structural flaws far more urgent than in other nations.

The Way Forward: Beyond Symbolism to Structural Change

In its 1995 Final Report, the Joint Select Committee on Constitutional and Electoral Reform in Jamaica concluded that a complete departure from the Westminster system was neither practical nor desirable, given how deeply embedded it is in the country’s political framework for nearly  fifty years. In this context, the current constitutional amendment must be seen not merely as a symbolic break from the monarchy, but as an opportunity to initiate meaningful structural reform. A crucial starting point is to revisit CAB II and re-examine the powers of the PM/executive, with a view to decentralizing authority and democratizing governance processes. Additionally, it is critical to reevaluate the role of the Privy Council as the apex court of appeal in Jamaica.

Zitiervorschlag: Sinha, Aaditi, Ditching the Crown, Keeping the Chains?: Jamaica’s 2024 Constitutional Amendment Bills and the “Westmonster” Legacy, JuWissBlog Nr. 60/2025 v. 08.07.2025, https://www.juwiss.de/60-2025/

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